They Often Are Half Obscure: The
Rights of the Individual and the
Legacy of Oliver W. Holmes

SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR*

These remarks were delivered April 9, 1992 at the Nathaniel L.
Nathanson Memorial Lecture series at the University of San
Diego and are published here with only minor revisions. The usual
academic ornamentation by way of footnotes has been added to
enable interested persons to find the sources referred to in the
lecture.

Most of us like to celebrate birthdays and anniversaries. I am no
exception, and today it is my purpose to celebrate and note an important anniversary. It is sixty years since one of my predecessors,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, retired from his duties at the Supreme Court. His life and his work have been celebrated often and
with good reason. Let me explain why.
Many believe that one of the most significant contributions made
by Western legal doctrine is the concept of enlisting the judiciary as
a partner in drawing the line between the individual and the power
of the state. Justice Holmes was the chief architect of the application
of our Bill of Rights to the states, and he set the standards for constitutional decision making. He used his incredible intellect to lay
bare the policy choices in constitutional cases. He taught us that
"the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience" 1 and
that the Constitution "does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics."2
In 1901, a year before he took his seat on the Supreme Court of
the United States, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: "The men whom I
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
1.

OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).

2.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

should be tempted to commemorate would be the originators of
transforming thought. They often are half obscure, because
what the
'3
world pays for is judgment, not the original mind."
Holmes was writing in half praise of Chief Justice John Marshall-he thought Marshall lacked an original mind-but he may
well have been giving some thought to himself and to how he would
be remembered when the time came to commemorate his life and
work. It would be hard to come up with a more accurate prediction
of how he would in fact be remembered nearly a century later. The
world does pay for judgment, and the world got fifty years'
worth from Holmes-twenty on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, from 1882 to 1902, and then thirty on the Supreme Court of
the United States, from 1902 to 1932. Of course, that is not the
whole story. Other Justices have served comparable tenures and are
barely remembered today. No one commemorates the career of Samuel Miller, who spent twenty-eight years on the Court, or William
Johnson, who was a Justice for thirty years, or even Bushrod Washington, who sat on the Court for thirty-one years-these men have
been forgotten by everyone except legal antiquarians. Even Edward
White, who spent the last nineteen of his twenty-seven years on the
Court as Holmes' colleague and the last eleven of those nineteen as
the Chief Justice, is largely lost to history.
Instead, Holmes is remembered exactly as he would have liked, as
an "originator of transforming thought." And his description of
such people, that they "often are half obscure," fits our memory of
Holmes perfectly. It may sound a little odd to refer to Holmes as
half obscure. After all, there is no figure in American legal thought
whose life and whose writings have been more frequently examined.
But when it comes to the influence of Holmes on our notions of the
individual's rights against the state, Holmes remains half obscure in
a double sense. His contributions to our understanding of the Bill of
Rights are unmistakable and were enough to move Justice Robert
Jackson to refer to Holmes as one of the two "most liberty-alert Justices of all times." 4 But they coexist uneasily with a full picture of
Holmes the man and Holmes the Justice. If much of Holmes'
thought is in full view today, because it continues to influence the
way we conceive of the balance between the individual and the state,
there is another portion, a less familiar part, that no longer exerts
such an influence. And even within the sphere in which Holmes continues to inform our understanding of the proper balance between
the government and its citizens, his influence is only half perceived
3. OLIVER W. HOLMES, John Marshall, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 269 (1920,
reprinted 1952) [hereinafter COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS].

4. The other was Justice Brandeis. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 29 (1948)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
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by most. Certain of his contributions receive the entire spotlight,
while others remain neglected.
I.
At the beginning, Holmes' influence would have been nearly impossible to predict. When Holmes was appointed to the Court in
1902, he was an unlikely person to develop a jurisprudence of individual liberties. He was already sixty-one years old and was well
known as a writer and a state court judge. He had published his
most celebrated work, The Common Law, more than twenty years
before. He was the author of innumerable articles and opinions.
None of this work gave any indication that Holmes would have any
particular interest in the rights of the individual.
Of course, Holmes can hardly be faulted for this. As a scholar, his
interests ran to common law subjects like torts or contracts. As a
state court judge, Holmes had little occasion to consider the Bill of
Rights, which was understood at the time to limit the power only of
the federal government, not the states. Most of his caseload concerned the same common law fields Holmes had explored as a
scholar.
In the legal climate of the late nineteenth century, Holmes' lack of
interest in the Bill of Rights was the norm. Even in the federal
courts, the Bill of Rights was rarely at issue. The Fourth Amendment, for example, which prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures," and which in the last three decades has accounted for a
relatively large share of the Supreme Court's caseload, was the subject of almost no litigation. As late as 1927, Felix Frankfurter could
confidently assert (in an article about Holmes) that whether the police had violated the Fourth Amendment was one of a group of mundane questions that "are neither frequent nor fighting issues before
the [Supreme] Court." 5 That Holmes took no interest in the Bill of
Rights before he took his seat on the Court thus makes him no more
or less than a man of his times.
Much of Holmes' scholarly work had been devoted to debunking
the widespread idea that human beings were born with "natural
rights" that were conferred by God and could be derived from broad
5. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution, 41
121, 124 (1927).

HARV.

L.

REV.

moral principles. This was an idea that was basic to the jurisprudence of the time. In fact, it was an important element of the political philosophy underlying the formation of the nation itself; the
Declaration of Independence, for example, speaks of inalienable
God-given rights, the abridgement of which permits revolution. Yet
Holmes disagreed quite strongly. He wrote:
The law talks about rights, and duties ....and nothing is... more common
in legal reasoning, than to take these words in their moral sense.... and so
to drop into fallacy .... [N]othing but confusion of thought can result
from assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are equally rights in
the sense of the Constitution and the law."8

These are not the words of a man prone to an expansive reading of
the Bill of Rights. Holmes continued to observe a rigid distinction
between law and morality while on the Court. In 1918, Holmes explained that "[t]he jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to
be in that native state of mind that accepts what has been familiar
and accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be
accepted by all men everywhere."' 7 He found such a view preposterous. "The most fundamental of the supposed preexisting rights," he
wrote, "the right to life-is sacrificed without a scruple not only in
war, but whenever the interest of society, that is, of the predominant
power in the community, is thought to demand it.""
That there were no natural rights did not mean there were no
rights at all, of course; it only meant that the rights had to be embodied in a man-made law before they could be enforced. Holmes
made this distinction clear in one of the first of his many letters to
Harold Laski, in which Holmes admitted: "All my life I have
sneered at the natural rights of man - and at times I have thought
that the bills of rights in Constitutions were overworked - but...
they embody principles that men have died for ...."9
Holmes' initial distinguishing mark on the Court was his series of
dissents from opinions striking down social welfare legislation, and
his view of the Court's limited role with respect to economic regulation may be his strongest legacy to current American jurisprudence.
These dissents provided an occasion for Holmes to set out a theory of
the Constitution that would enable the government to prevail over
the individual most of the time. The most well known of these cases
was the first, Lochner v. New York, decided in 1905, in which the
6. OLIVER W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra
note 3, at 171-72.
7. OLIVER W. HOLMES, NaturalLaw, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 3,
at 312.
8. Id. at 314.
9. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), in 1
HoLMES-LASKI LETTERS 21 (Howe ed. 1953).
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Supreme Court of the United States struck down a state health measure limiting the working hours of bakers. Holmes' dissent includes
the ringing words that have been studied by generations of American
law students:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain.. . . But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It is made for people
of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain
opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conembodying them
clude our judgment upon the question whether statutes
0
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.'

Holmes would repeat this theme in countless similar cases
throughout his career. He dissented, for example, when the Court
struck down a federal statute establishing a minimum wage for
women 1 and when the Court invalidated a state law forbidding employers from requiring their employees not to join labor unions. 12 But
his disagreement with his colleagues was not based on any concern
for the health of bakers, or for the ability of women to earn a decent
wage, or for rights of workers to join unions. In each of these cases,
other Justices had written dissenting opinions voicing such concerns,
but Holmes intentionally chose not to join them. Holmes' point was
a different one-it was not that the law was properly aimed, but that
the state had the power to pass the law regardless of its aim.
"[S]tate laws may regulate life in many ways," Holmes wrote,
"which we... might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical
as this."' 3 As Holmes put it, the supposed "liberty of the citizen to
do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of
others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some wellknown writers, 1 4 was no more than a romantic ideal with no place
in the rough and tumble world,
Holmes' often rigid majoritarianism shows up much more clearly
in a group of cases we hear little about these days, because in these
cases Holmes' majoritarianism coincides with an outcome modern
minds generally find repugnant. I would like to make brief mention
of three of them.
In Bailey v. Alabama, 5 the Court considered a state law that
10.
11.
12.
13.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75.

14.

Id.

15.

219 U.S. 219 (1911).

criminalized an employee's breach of an employment contract. This
was an era when agricultural employees in the South often had to
borrow money from landowners and agree to work off the debt with
their labor. The Court found that the law's effect was to create a
form of slavery, in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.16 Holmes dissented on the ground that the abolition of
slavery did not limit the power of the government to compel an employee to continue
working until he or the employee had paid off his
17
or her debts.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,"" the Court refused to permit Nebraska to
criminalize the teaching of languages other than English. Holmes
again dissented. As he explained, "[n]o one would doubt that a
teacher might be forbidden to teach many things .

. . ."9 A

prohibi-

tion on the teaching of foreign languages was simply one aspect of
the state's power to dictate what an individual might or might not
learn.
Finally, in Buck v. Bell,20 the 1927 case that still serves as one of
our most startling reminders of how quickly things change, Holmes
wrote for a unanimous Court in upholding the power of the state to
sterilize the mentally retarded. In words that sound chilling to the
modern ear, Holmes explained:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the

best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon
those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices,
often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being

swamped with incompetence.... [S]ociety can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three

generations of imbeciles are enough. 21

Throughout much of his tenure on the Court and in much of his
scholarly work Holmes took a strong view of the power of the democratic state to legislate standards for personal conduct. Holmes' faith
in eugenics and his affirmation of governmental power have been frequently criticized, beginning in Holmes' own day.22 But this is the
part of Holmes' jurisprudence that exerts the least influence today.
The Court has never cited Buck v. Bell, for instance, as support for
any important proposition. It is in this sense that this part of
16. Id. at 245.
17. Id. at 247.
18. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
19. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
20. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
21. Id. at 207. The bleak view of the world embodied in Holmes' opinion was also
evident when Judge Learned Hand asked Holmes whether he regretted his childlessness.
After some reflection, Holmes replied: "This is not the kind of world I want to bring
anyone else into." LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL 228 (1991).

22. See H.L.

POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES

(summarizing and listing examples of such criticism).

1-2, 15 n.1 (1991)
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Holmes' jurisprudence has become "obscure"-it may still be recalled, but it no longer possesses any vitality.
II.
Putting aside his dissents of the Lochner era, Holmes' strongest
influence on current constitutional interpretation is his view that the
First Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the intervening years, the
Court has incorporated all of the Bill of Rights, with only two exceptions, into the Due Process Clause. There is no question of the tremendous importance the Bill of Rights plays in our lives today.
Until the First World War the First Amendment was an extremely rare subject of litigation before the Court. Holmes wrote an
opinion for the Court in one of these unusual prewar cases, Patterson v. Colorado,23 decided in 1907. One would hardly suspect that a
decade later, the author would become the Court's leading exponent
of the freedom of speech.
Mr. Patterson was the publisher of articles and a cartoon that accused the Colorado Supreme Court of having decided some recent
cases in a corrupt manner. The Colorado court itself fined Patterson
for contempt. Holmes had no difficulty dismissing Patterson's argument that the First Amendment gave him a right to express his opinion of the judges. Holmes explained that "the main purpose" of the
First Amendment is only "to prevent ...

previous restraints upon

publications"-it was not intended to "prevent the subsequent punishment of such [publications] as may be deemed contrary to the
public welfare. '"24

This view of the First Amendment-that it prevented the government from suppressing speech in advance, but permitted the prosecution of offending speech afterwards-was widely held at the time. It
was not universally held; Justice Harlan dissented in Patterson and
expressed the now orthodox opinion that the First Amendment carries force both before and after publication. 25 Initially, however,
Holmes took the narrower position.
By 1919, Holmes had changed his views. 26 The case of Schenk v.
23. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
24. Id. at 462 (emphasis in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20
Mass. 313 (3 Pick. 304, 313, 314 (1825)).
25. Id. at 465.
26. For more detail on this transformation, see David S. Bogen, The Free Speech
Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HorsTRA L. REV. 97 (1982).

United States27 involved the prosecution of a man who printed and
circulated leaflets during the First World War, arguing that the government lacked the power to conscript soldiers to fight in Europe. 28
In an opinion written by Holmes, the Court affirmed Schenk's conviction, but in a manner that revealed a broader understanding of
the First Amendment than had ever been expressed by the Court:
"It well may be," said Holmes, "that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints
...
"29 Here, Holmes expounded a view of the First Amendment
that was revolutionary for the Court. "We admit," he wrote, "that in
many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that
was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional
rights."30 The government could prosecute Mr. Schenk only because
he expressed his opposition to the draft in wartime, when his words
posed "a clear and present danger" to the war effort.
When it was written, Holmes' opinion marked a significant
change. For the first time, the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment protects the rights of citizens in peacetime to criticize
the government and to express their opinions on controversial public
issues. Schenk was a landmark in this regard.
Later that year, in another case involving criticism of the government's conduct of the war, Holmes had further opportunity to express his views of the First Amendment. The defendants in Abrams
v. United States31 had published articles asserting that the war was
being fought for the benefit of the rich, but was not in the interest of
workers. Despite pressure from some of the other Justices, who
thought a separate opinion by Holmes would lend support to a radical cause,32 Holmes dissented in language that remains the classic
exposition of the rationale for a right to freedom of speech. He
wrote:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If
you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result
with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep
away all opposition .... But when men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the .theory of our Constitution."3
27.

28.

249 U.S. 47 (1919).

For a detailed account of Schenk, see JEREMY
MAKE No LAW (1989).
29. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 51.
30. Id. at 52.
31. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
32. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 537-38.
33. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.

COHEN, CONGRESS SHALL
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In the end, it has been Holmes' view of the freedom of speech that
has prevailed.3 4 It took some time. In the 1920s, although the Court
silently adopted Holmes' view that the First Amendment protects
the right to express unpopular opinions, Holmes was still disagreeing
with the Court in cases involving criticism of the government right
up until he retired.15 Even in the aftermath of the Second World
War, when the Court finally explicitly adopted Holmes' view that
the government could not punish spoken beliefs that did not pose a
"clear and present danger," the Court continued to permit the government to prosecute those
who advocated support for Communism
36
or for the Soviet Union.
It was not until 1969, in the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio,37 that
Holmes' broad view of a constitutional right to express even the most
noxious opinions finally took hold. In that case, the Court drew a
firm distinction between the advocacy of beliefs, which receives constitutional protection regardless of the content of those beliefs, and
the "incitement to imminent lawless action," which can be prosecuted as a crime.38
Even where speech is repugnant, and even where it might well
lead to violence somewhere down the road, our Constitution protects the right of the speaker to be free from the government's
interference.
This is a legacy of Holmes that should not be underestimated.
That anyone should be able to say whatever he likes, no matter how
unsettling it may be to the people in power, is hardly an obvious
proposition and is hardly universally accepted even today. There are
many places where people are still thrown in prison for expressing
views critical of the authorities. There were many more such places
seventy years ago-and the United States was one of them-when
Holmes wrote the opinion in Schenk and Abrams. The freedom to
express unpopular or controversial ideas is a concept far too large to
34. On the evolution of Holmes' views and their influence, see GERALD GuNTHER,
1019-20, 1040-41 (12th ed. 1991).
35. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring, joined by Holmes). Holmes
joined Court majorities in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), which struck
down a statute prohibiting the display of a red flag, and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931), which struck down a statute authorizing the suppression of newspapers
before publication.
36. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203 (1961).
37. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
38. Id. at 449.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

attribute to any one person, but its timing in the history of American
jurisprudence can be traced directly to Holmes.
Another vital modern legacy of Justice Holmes was his work in
using the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
protect minority voting rights. He initiated the discussion in Nixon v.
Herndon.3 9
III.
There is one other contribution of Holmes that I want to mention-one which is noted less often but which is also very important.
In our federal system of criminal justice, the local state courts
handle most of the ordinary criminal cases. When a state prisoner
has been denied his or her rights under the Constitution, however,
the prisoner may seek a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court.
This has been true for most of our history.40 But our current understanding of the scope of the writ-that is, the scope of the power of
federal courts to intervene in state criminal prosecutions-derives
substantially from Holmes. His influence can be seen quite starkly
by comparing two cases, decided eight years apart.
The first is Frank v. Magnum,41 decided in 1915. Leo Frank was
sentenced to death in the state of Georgia after having been convicted of a highly publicized murder. He may well have been innocent. 42 Throughout his trial, the courtroom was packed with
spectators inflamed by anti-Semitism, and an angry mob waited just
outside the courtroom door. The danger to Frank and to the jurors,
should Frank not have been convicted, was so apparent that at one
point the judge and the jurors had to meet with the Chief of Police
and the Colonel of the local militia to secure everyone's safety. Unsurprisingly, the jury found Frank guilty.
Frank sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts on the
ground that he had been denied his constitutional right to due process of law, but the Supreme Court held he could not obtain one.
The Court reasoned that Georgia provided an appeal from a conviction alleged to be the result of an unfair trial. Frank had in fact
appealed, but the Georgia courts had found that his trial was fair.
The majority concluded the federal courts lacked the authority to
upset this finding. Once the state courts had determined Frank's trial
39. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
40. In 1867, Congress extended the writ to state prisoners held in violation of the
Constitution. The current version of that statute is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
41. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
42. Hugo A. Bedou & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 115 (1987). The Governor of Georgia commuted
Frank's sentence to life imprisonment, but Frank was killed by a mob two months later.
He was pardoned posthumously in 1986. Id.
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was not unfair, that was the end of the matter.
Holmes dissented. As for Frank's right to due process, Holmes explained that "[w]hatever disagreement there may be as to the scope
of the phrase 'due process of law,' there can be no doubt that it
embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial, with opportunity to be heard. Mob law does not become due process of law by
securing the assent of a terrorized jury. 43 And as for the more technical but equally important question of a federal court's power to
intervene where due process was lacking, Holmes chided his colleagues for their undue deference to the local courts. In his view, the
federal courts' "power to secure fundamental rights ...

becomes a

duty and must be put forth." As Holmes put it, "the supremacy of
the law and of'44the Federal Constitution should be vindicated in a
case like this."
Eight years later, the composition of the Court had changed somewhat, and a similar case came to the Court. This time Holmes'
broader view of the power of federal courts to enforce the constitutional rights of criminal defendants commanded a majority. The case
of Moore v. Dempsey45 involved the trial of a group of black men
accused of killing a white man, a trial similar to Leo Frank's a few
years earlier. A mob surrounded the courtroom and threatened to
lynch the defendants and the jurors if the latter did not find the
former guilty. The entire trial lasted only forty-five minutes, and the
jury took only five minutes to reach a guilty verdict. As in Frank
eight years before, the state courts permitted an appeal, but found
that the trial had not been unfair. This time, however, Holmes had
the support of his colleagues in refusing to defer to the state courts.
Where "the State Courts failed to correct the wrong," he observed,
nothing "can prevent this Court from securing to the petitioners
their constitutional rights.""
This was a fundamental shift in the Court's understanding of the
power of federal courts to enforce the constitutional rights of accused criminals. Holmes' broader view has stayed with us. While the
Court has continuously tinkered with the finer points of the scope of
habeas corpus, the fundamental point Holmes expressed in the
Frank dissent and the Moore majority opinion has been repeatedly

43.
44.

Frank, 237 U.S. at 347 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 348-49.

45. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
46. Id. at 91.

reaffirmed ever since.47
Holmes' influence in this area is not nearly as well known as his
influence with respect to the freedom of speech, but it may be
equally important.48 We have seen quite dramatic changes in criminal procedure in the United States over the last two generations.
Many of these changes could not have taken place without a broad
conception of the power of federal courts to ensure that individuals
are treated fairly in the state courts. Without Holmes' broad view,
the federal courts (including the Supreme Court) would simply have
had no occasion to define the constitutional rights possessed by defendants in local prosecutions.
IV.
On Holmes' ninetieth birthday, the year before Benjamin Cardozo
would replace Holmes on the Court, Cardozo had this to say about
Holmes:
Men speak of him as a great Liberal, a lover of Freedom and its apostle.

All this in truth he is, yet in his devotion to Freedom he has not been willing to make himself the slave of a mere slogan. No one has labored more
incessantly to demonstrate the truth that rights are never absolute, though
they are ever struggling and tending to declare themselves as such. 49

Cardozo may have captured the paradox embedded in Holmes'
views of the Bill of Rights. As we have seen, his statements of the
values underlying the freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial
marked him as the great liberal justice of his era. This side of
Holmes' jurisprudence possesses more vitality today than even in his
own times, as his dissenting opinions have come to define our jurisprudence in these areas. At the same time, as Cardozo noted,
Holmes did not conceive of individual rights as absolutes. Where
they conflicted with the rational preferences of the majority, it was
the majority's will that prevailed. This side of Holmes' thought, the
often rigid positivism that would have permitted the state to sterilize
the mentally retarded or prohibit the teaching of foreign languages,
exerts no similar influence. It is a matter of historical interest only;
in terms of the current understanding of the relationship between the
individual and the state, this side of Holmes' jurisprudence has
slipped into obscurity.
Justice Holmes believed passionately in the democratic process
and he generally refused to substitute his own judgment for the will
of the people as expressed through legislation. At the same time, he
47.
U.S. 72,
48.
(1956).
49.

See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 464 (1953); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
79 (1977); McClesky v. Zant, Ill S. Ct. 1454, 1462 (1991).
See SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS 262
Benjamin N. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1931).
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applied the constitutional limits expressed in the Bill of Rights to the
actions of government as a means of preserving the autonomy of the
individual. As Professor Bert Neuborne puts it:
When a modern constitutional judge is confronted with a "hard" case,
Holmes is at her side with three gentle reminders: (1) Intellectual honesty
about the available policy choices; (2) disciplined self-restraint in respecting
the majority's policy choice; and (3) principled commitment to defense of
individual autonomy, even in the face of majority action .... The words
may be different today; but Holmes wrote the music.50

Our celebration of Holmes' influence today pays the highest tribute to the breadth of his thought. Judges and scholars come and go,
and the main body of their work may have an influence after they
have gone. But Holmes' thought was so broad that even a small portion of it can cast the largest shadow.

50. Bert Neuborne, The Bill of Rights in the Time of Justice Holmes and Today
(1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).

